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Abstract
This paper aims to measure the efficiency of different road pricing schemes (Pigouvian
tax, flat tax and cordon toll) to address congestion externalities when the locations of jobs
and dwellings within a city are endogenous. The model captures the fact that commuters
face a trade-off between taking advantage of the wage premium in the Central Business Dis-
trict (CBD) and being stuck in traffic. I find that the Pigouvian tax strategy is not a social
optimum due to the presence of two market failures in the urban economy: congestion and
misallocation of jobs within the city. A Pigouvian tax on commuters cannot solve two dif-
ferent problems simultaneously, namely, reducing the congestion level given the locations of
jobs and reaching the optimal spatial allocation of firms. Without regulation, the number of
jobs in the CBD is too high (and the congestion cost is excessive), while the Pigouvian tax
generates a CBD that is too small. In addition, a flat tax is not necessarily worse than a
Pigouvian tax, in contrast to the cordon toll.
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1 Introduction
Urban growth leads to serious traffic congestion in cities worldwide. Emerging economies need to
set up some efficient urban policies for congestion management. In the United States, Los Angeles
was the most congested city in 2016, and commuters lost 104 hours due to their home-to-work
travel (Cookson and Pishue, 2017). In Thailand, commuters lost 61 hours on average in traffic due
to congestion, regardless of the city. Long travel time delays are also measured in Colombia, Russia
and Indonesia according to a recent study by Cookson and Pishue (2017). To improve travel time
reliability, road pricing policies, such as the cordon toll, have been implemented in cities around
the world (Small and Go´mez-Iba´n˜ez, 1997). An urban toll aims to regulate traffic demand within
some urban area or over a portion of a road during certain periods. Since 1975, Singapore has
charged commuters entering the city center a cordon toll to improve traffic flow. Indeed, traffic
demand dropped by 45% between 1975 and 1991 (Santos, 2005).
Including a congestion externality in an urban model may reduce the benefits of agglomeration
economies. Firms have incentives to be close to each other, hence generating increasing returns
and agglomeration economies (external and internal). However, gathering firms in either a Central
Business District (CBD) or Secondary Business Districts (SBDs) leads to high land rents at these
locations and high commuting costs for workers (Fujita and Thisse, 2013). Over the long run,
high home-to-work costs may induce adjustments of job and household locations, which requires
close scrutiny. The literature has studied the impacts of congestion on urban density and land
use using standard monocentric city models since the seminal work of Solow (1972). He is one of
the few authors that incorporated both land use for road infrastructure and congestion into an
urban economic model to determine the optimal allocation of land for road infrastructure1. Several
studies have used the standard but empirically questionable monocentric model for convenience
(Anas and Kim, 1996). Land in the CBD can be exclusively allotted to firms (Wheaton, 1998;
Brueckner, 2007; Larson and Yezer, 2015) or to mixed use (Anas and Kim, 1996; Fujita and
Ogawa, 1982). Arnott (1979) developed a theoretical model with congestion without internalizing
this externality, unlike Solow (1973, 1972). He extended Solow’s work on the relationship between
private land value and social land value in both residential and road use. The decision to internalize
congestion is at issue, as noted by Arnott’s works (1979, 2007). As workers respond to a pricing
scheme over the long run, complete internalization of the negative externality imposed on other
urban dwellers may not be efficient when a second market failure exists (Tikoudis et al., 2015).
Our objective is to understand the evolution of urban congestion and welfare by relocating jobs
in SBDs. This paper assesses which urban land use regulations and road pricing schemes improve
the welfare of the whole city. Three different taxes on commuters are evaluated: a Pigouvian tax, a
flat tax and a cordon toll. The urban model is a polycentric city with two externalities: (i) positive
agglomeration economies yielding a wage premium in the CBD compared to the SBDs and (ii) a
negative congestion externality due to home-to-work commutes. Work and residential places are
interdependent in household location choices.Several authors have examined road pricing schemes
effects using standard monocentric models (Wheaton, 1998; Brueckner, 2007; Tikoudis et al., 2015),
whereas only a few have investigated the same effects in polycentric cities (Zhang and Kockelman,
2016a). This approach enables us to reflect the tendency of developed cities (e.g Los Angeles,
Paris, Boston) to evolve toward decentralized and non-monocentric forms. Therefore, we can
1Strotz (1965) was the first to study the optimal provision of road facilities using a monocentric model with
congestion.
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discuss the efficiency effects and other impacts of urban policies (e.g., taxes and redistribution) in
relation to previous work on the monocentric case. In addition, the decentralization of jobs within
a city may reduce the average commuting distance and thus reduce traffic congestion for each
commuter compared to a monocentric city. This study has similarities with works by Zhang and
Kockelman (2016a, 2016b). They evaluate different urban policies and measure their impacts on
job decentralization, population density and firm distribution. However, they do not focus on the
optimal allocation of jobs within a polycentric city in relation to road pricing schemes. We provide
analytical solutions regarding the no-toll equilibrium, as well as the optimal and second-best sizes
of SBDs. In addition, our results are not based on simulations.
I find that the Pigouvian tax on commuters is not optimal. This can be explained by the
presence of two market failures in the urban economy: congestion and job misallocation within the
city. This tax cannot kill two birds with one stone, namely, reducing the congestion externality for
given workplace locations and yielding the optimal spatial allocation of firms. Firms do not take
the social costs of congestion into account when they decentralize jobs in the outskirts yielding too
large SBDs. In a no-toll equilibrium, the CBD (the residential area where workers live) is larger
than optimal. A large proportion of workers is eager to commute to the city center due to the
CBD’s wage premium compared to the SBDs. The private marginal gain of being closer to the
CBD is greater than the marginal cost incurred by those who already live there.
For a given city size, the Pigouvian tax on commuters makes the CBD too small in a polycentric
city. In other words, the SBD expands and increases the congestion externality of each road user
around the workplace. This second-best policy heavily corrects the congestion externality because
firms do not take the effects of jobs decentralization on congestion delay into account. This is
due to (i) the free location decisions of workers and (ii) endogenous workplaces. A flat tax and a
cordon toll do not achieve an optimal location for the SBD. This article recaptures the effects of
road pricing schemes that have been demonstrated in the literature on monocentric city. Tikoudis
et al. (2015) use numerical simulations in a different context and include a labor tax in their model
with road pricing schemes to study the tax interaction effects. Their results clarify that a road
toll is necessary and welfare improving when no distortions exist in the labor market. Tikoudis et
al. (2015) and Verhoef (2005) agree that a flat kilometer tax is more efficient than a cordon toll
in a monocentric structure. However, when a polycentric structure emerges, this result does not
hold, as the efficiency of the cordon toll or the flat tax depends mainly on the wage gap between
the business centers before the implementation of the road pricing scheme. Based on the initial
location of the SBD (a SBD that is too small or too large), a flat tax may be less (resp., more)
harmful than a cordon toll.
Related literature . Urban forms and traffic volume in cities with resulting congestion exter-
nalities are treated separately. Adding these features affects firm and household location choices
within a city. Two bodies of literature address both urban and transport issues. First, the stan-
dard urban model (i.e., the monocentric city) has been used since Solow (1972) to address road
land use and traffic congestion. One or more urban policies were evaluated in the case of one
(Arnott, 1979; Wheaton, 1998) or two (Wheaton, 2004; Tikoudis et al., 2015) externalities in a
monocentric city. Wheaton (1998) focused on urban form evolution when the congestion external-
ity is correctly internalized, examining the impacts on resident density and transport capacity in
a monocentric circular city. Wheaton (2004) and Arnott (2007) were interested in the interplay
between congestion and agglomeration externalities, and Tikoudis et al. (2015) questioned the
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impacts of various second-best road tolls on the labor market and welfare in the long run in order
to observe households’ decisions to adjust their labor supply and commuting distances.
Second, congestion management has been considered more recently for the polycentric city.
Anas and Kim (1996) studied the impacts of congestion on urban structure in a model of a linear,
“narrow” city with a link-node road network and households, firms and shopping centers with
endogenous locations. In more recent studies, Anas (2013) and Zhang and Kockelman (2016a)
analyzed the effects of road pricing schemes on workplace and residential locations as well as on
wages, rents, housing prices and land development. Anas (2013) provided some insights for the
city of Chicago, whereas Zhang and Kockelman (2016b) considered a general equilibrium model
including both agglomeration and congestion externalities with labor market and land use patterns.
Extension of the analysis of the impacts of congestion pricing policies on land use, rents and firm
locations to a polycentric structure is a recent development in urban economics, as illustrated
by Zhang and Kockelman (2016a). However, the existing literature has not fully addressed the
impacts of road pricing policies on the size of the CBD when two externalities interplay. This
study provides new insights and thus helps enrich knowledge in this stream of literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe our model’s assumptions. Then,
we briefly focus on road pricing scheme effects in a monocentric model in which households face
congestion costs. In section 4, we present the configuration in which the polycentric city hosts
homogeneous households in the city with a wage gap between the business centers in order to find
the equilibrium and optimal size of SBDs. In section 5, we evaluate the efficiency of the three road
pricing schemes in terms of congestion management and the allocation of jobs. We then perform
one simulation with a set of fixed parameter values to confirm or reverse our analytical results and
discuss our results by extending the model to include two transport modes in particular. Section
8 concludes.
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2 The model
The urban economy designed here builds on the basic model from Denant-Boe`mont et al. (2018)
and Cavailhe`s et al. (2007). Only one closed-form linear city is built with a fixed population L.
While Gaigne´ et al. (2012) analyzed an urban system and the carbon footprints of both firms
and households in different city structures, this model copes with congestion and agglomeration
externalities within a single city, especially a polycentric structure. The monocentric city is used to
compare our findings with those reported in the previous literature (Tikoudis et al. 2015; Wheaton,
1998; Arnott, 2007). Locations of SBDs are determined endogenously in the polycentric city.
2.1 The city
Consider a city endowed with L > 0 homogeneous workers who are free to choose their residential
location and workplace. The city is described by m one-dimensional half-lines sharing the same
initial point x = 0. Firms are located either in the CBD or in an SBD. Firms do not use land so
that households and firms do not compete for land. Both the CBD and the SBDs are surrounded
by residential areas occupied by workers and transport infrastructure. Distances and locations
to the CBD are expressed by the same variable x measured from 0. Individuals travel only for
commuting purposes. They use a single one-way road that ends at the location of their respective
workplace. No wasteful commuting occurs in equilibrium. Each worker decides to locate as close
to her workplace as possible because spatial mismatches would not maximize her utility. The CBD
border ẑ and the location of the SBD zS along each spoke are determined endogenously (the city
is assumed to be symmetric around the CBD). The supply of housing floor space δ is constant per
unit of distance from the CBD and normalized to 1. At each location x, a and (1 − a) are the
exogenous fractions of land devoted to residential purposes and road infrastructure, respectively.
The job allocation within the city in relation to transport-related congestion stemming from the
flow of commuters is the primary consideration. Therefore, the parameter a is exogenously given,
leading to a particular land use pattern (Solow and Vickrey, 1971)2. Accordingly, the total housing
space available is equal to may, with city size y representing the radius limit from the CBD.
2.2 Households
As a matter of fact, only one class of worker is considered in our model. They earn income ωi with
i = C when they work in the CBD or i = S in a SBD. These households have the same preferences
and the same utility function, which depends on two consumption goods: land, which is used as a
proxy for housing, and the nume´raire given by:
U(q, h), (1)
where q is the consumption of the nume´raire, and h is the consumption of housing floor space.
Housing demand is assumed to be constant and normalized to 1; hence, U(q, h) = q. As a
consequence, the residential density is constant per unit of distance and does not replicate the
widely demonstrated fact that population density is decreasing with the distance from the CBD
2The optimal allocation of road facilities has already been discussed in the literature (Strotz, 1965; Solow, 1973,
1972). I do not focus on the optimal land use allocation of residential and road capacities in the model, enabling
me to disentangle the different effects at work.
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(Brueckner, 1987). Thus, the fixed city size y depends only on exogenous components because our
main interest in this study is to observe the rise and fall of the relative share of jobs in the CBD. In
addition, the traditional trade-off between low/high land rents and long/short journey to work is
respected, as in numerous urban economic models with fixed lot sizes (Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg,
2002; Gaigne´ et al., 2016)3. Each household reaches a common utility level U¯ within the city in
equilibrium. The time constraint of a worker located at x is given by:
1 = TL + T (x), (2)
where TL is the amount of labor time, and T (x) is the commuting time from her residential location
x to the business district’s location zi, with zi = 0 (resp., zi = zS) if her job is located in the CBD
(resp., SBD). Hence, T (x) > 0 is the endogenous time spent commuting per unit of distance.
It depends on the congestion imposed by other travelers and the transport mode4. The budget
constraint of a worker located at x can be written as follows:
ωi(1− T (x)) + G¯+ R¯ = q + R(x)
a
h(x) + t0(x) + τk(x), (3)
where k = Pigouvian tax, flat tax or cordon toll, t0 represents the total pecuniary costs of trans-
portation between the workplace and the residence, and R(x) is the land rent at x. R(x)/a is
the price paid by a consumer to reside at x. The transport costs contain a fixed component t0
reflecting fuel, insurance and average maintenance costs for using a car. Thus, the pecuniary costs
of using a car differ only with the distances traveled by workers. In the absence of road pricing
schemes, no transfer is received by workers (i.e., it is a competitive market). When a road pricing
scheme is implemented, tax revenues and aggregated land rents ALRj (j = M for a monocentric
city and j = S for a polycentric one) are returned via a lump sum with G¯ and R¯:
G¯ =
Gk
L
, (4)
and:
Gk = ma
∫ y
0
τk(x)dx,
where Gk is the total amount of tax collected. They receive the second amount given by:
R¯ =
ALRj
L
,
3Including an endogenous housing demand would increase mechanically the city size while the share of land use
devoted to housing is fixed. When a polycentric structure emerges, the average land rent decreases as there are new
subcenters. Indeed, these subcenters relax the pressure on land rent near the CBD location. For a given housing
size, city limit remains fixed. But, when a monocentric city shifts to a polycentric city, housing demand adjusts.
Each household live further out her workplace because the average land rent has lowered. To solve the population
constraint, the city has to expand. Therefore they live in larger housing size in a larger city. All things being equal,
the size of the CBD increases as well. As a consequence, the congestion delay would rise for each commuter within
the city but this negative externality slows down the urban sprawl simultaneously. As long as the size of the CBD
does not equal y, each worker will face a lower extra travel time against a monocentric structure. This is also true
when the city size is fixed. Our main objective is to determine the effects of three road pricing schemes disregarding
the long-run changes of the size of the city.
4In this model, time allocated to sleep and leisure is not taken into account. A model with fixed working times
and endogenous leisure time would not qualitatively change our results. A case study with two transport modes is
discussed at the end.
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where:
ALRj = m
∫ y
0
R(x)dx (5)
is the aggregate land rent at the whole city. This approach is in line with previous work by Zhang
and Kockelman (2016a) and Tikoudis et al. (2015). We implicitly assume that a benevolent
planner levies a tax on off-farm land rents and redistributes it to residents. Otherwise, households
incur a welfare loss due to a change in aggregate land rents when policies are implemented in this
closed-city model (Solow, 1973; Parry and Bento, 2001).
2.3 Congestion costs and transport infrastructure
A stationary-state congestion model is implemented in the urban economic model (see Small et
al., 2007). All workers take a single road to commute. They face no costs to enter the road, which
has no distinctive features such as traffic signals or stops. All homogeneous users are assumed
to drive a car with the same characteristics. They face a travel time cost that depends on the
number of users on the road at any point and the fraction of land devoted to roads. The road’s
length corresponds to the city size y. Travel time is increasing with the number of commuters on
the road. Households commute to the edge of the CBD and/or of the SBDs according to their
residential location. Here, f(x) denotes the cumulative number of travelers using the single road
who live beyond the distance x. The travel time per unit of distance at the portion x has the
following form5:
τ0 + τ1f(x)
β with β = 1 (6)
f(x) =

∫ ẑ
x
l
(1−a)dz, if x < ẑ∫ y
x
l
(1−a)dz, if x > zS
0, if x = y.
and l =
a
h
(7)
The free-flow travel time is equal to τ0, and the second term includes the time delay at x induced
by the cumulative number of road users living beyond x. This means that the average speed
decreases when traffic density increases; namely, there is pure flow congestion. τ1 is a sensitivity
parameter multiplied by the aggregate traffic flow f(x) arriving at a location x along the road.
The magnitude of β is widely discussed in the literature (Small, 1992; Arnott et al., 2005) but no
consensus has emerged. Arnott (2007) notes that empirical estimates are close to 1.0 when long
roads are considered. This travel time function yields a specific traffic congestion at the segment
x. The travel demand of drivers living before x is not included in this function. Nevertheless, we
must consider the traffic slowdown when they take the road. Furthermore, each commuter living
in x imposes a travel delay on other road users living before and beyond x. In turn, these road
users cause congestion externalities incurred by each commuter living in x. Thus, we integrate
this travel time from the workplace location (the destination) to the trip origin (the residential
place) to consider an aggregate congestion externality. We obtain the total commuting time of an
5see Small et al. (2007), Arnott (2007) and Tikoudis et al. (2015)
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individual living at distance x, which is expressed as follows:
T (x) =

∫
x
0
[τ0 + τ1
∫ ẑ
x
a
h(1−a)dz]dx, when 0 < x < ẑ∫
x
zS
[τ0 + τ1
∫ y
x
a
h(1−a)dz]dx, when zS < x < y
−
∫
x
zS
−[τ0 + τ1
∫ ẑ
x
a
h(1−a)dz]dx, when ẑ < x < zS.
(8)
It allows us to obtain the travel time per unit of distance near the resident’s location. Then, we
can quantify the total travel time to her workplace. Incurred congestion is measured at x, which
leads to a travel delay along a worker’s journey to her business district. As there exists spatial
symmetry around the SBD, the second term of the equation can be used to measure congestion
along the road section from ẑ to zS. Then, we insert the total commuting time (8) and the time
constraint (2) into the budget constraint (3) to obtain the indirect utility of a worker:
VC(x) = ωC − ωC
[
x(τ0 + t0) +
τ1a
h(1− a) [ẑx−
x2
2
]
]
− R(x)h
a
+ τk(x) + G¯+ R¯. (9)
when she lives in and commutes to the CBD and:
VS(x) = ωS−ωS
[
(x− zS)(τ0 + t0) + τ1a
h(1− a) [y(x− zS) +
z2S − x2
2
]
]
−R(x)h
a
+τk(x)+G¯+R¯. (10)
when she lives in and commutes to the SBD. Accordingly, in a competitive market framework, the
household that places the highest bid obtains housing at x, which is in line with Alonso (1964) and
urban economic models. Households spend their income, net of the opportunity cost of commuting
and the monetary costs of transport, on housing and a composite good. This allows us to capture
a basic trade-off between land rents and commuting costs.
2.4 Urban toll
We examine three sets of policies in order to tackle the congestion externality caused by travel
demand: a Pigouvian tax, a flat kilometer tax and a cordon toll. As congestion delays increase
the travel time per unit of distance, this externality may be priced in our model and enter the
budget constraint of each household. In the budget constraint, the component τk(x) reflects the
level of tax (τk) each commuter pays during her home-to-work journey. First, we implement a
Pigouvian tax (τk(x) = τP (x)) that prices the marginal external cost of congestion. A commuter
at x imposes travel time delays on other commuters living before and after her location x. It
concerns commuters using the same road segment towards a common destination. Accordingly,
we price this externality by multiplying the additional travel time per unit of distance by the
opportunity cost of working time
[
ωi
TL+T (x)|x−zi|
]
. The labor supply is inelastic within the city, and
each worker can place a higher bid to move closer to her workplace with this gross value of time
to avoid a travel time delay. The wage rate is divided by the total time endowment normalized to
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1 uniformly. Hence, the toll is expressed as follows6:
τP (x) =

∫
ẑ
0
[
τ1a
h(1−a)
∫ ẑ
x
ωC dz
]
dx, when 0 < x < ẑ∫
x
ẑ
[
τ1a
h(1−a)
∫ y
x
ωC dz
]
dx, when ẑ < x < y.
(11)
This is a location-constrained first-best policy, as workers are free to choose their residential loca-
tion according to their bid rent. In addition, this tax does not correct its capitalization in aggregate
land rents. Second, we analyze another second-best policy that aims to reduce congestion exter-
nalities. A flat kilometer tax is levied with no differentiation among commuters. This tax does not
vary over space or time. It is only proportional to the traveled distance. Each worker commutes
to her workplace within the city:
τF (x) = tFx with tF > 0 (12)
A cordon toll is then the other road pricing scheme we consider. Commuters living beyond the
location αẑ (0 < α < 1) of the toll are charged, while those living at x < αẑ face no toll7. The
charging function is given by:
τC(x) =
{
c if αẑ ≤ x ≤ ẑ
0, otherwise.
(13)
All roads charge tolls to prevent traffic from being reallocated to other roads.
2.5 Wages
In line with the models of Fujita and Ogawa (1982) and Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002), firms
produce a composite good. Their only production factor is labor. Each firm makes a profit denoted
Πi whether it produces in the CBD (i = C) or in a SBD (i = S):
Πi = pqi − ωiTLi (14)
where p is the output price, qi is the output size with qi = AiT
γ
Li, Ai ≥ 1 and γ ≤ 1, and
TLi is the total labor time units
8. Ai is a positive agglomeration externality depending on the
business centers (CBD and SBDs). This term affects productivity as a positive multiplier. Firms
clustered in the CBD take advantage of a more efficient environment that takes concrete form as a
productivity drop AC > AS = 1
9. AC is increasing with positive agglomeration economies in the
6The details of calculations are reported in Appendix B.
7α is purely exogenous in this case and does not represent a location of the cordon, which would maximize
the indirect utility as in Verhoef’s (2005) numerical simulations. We have left aside the debate about the optimal
location of the cordon discussed in the literature (Mun et al., 2005; Verhoef, 2005). Our main interest is analyzing
the pecuniary and job relocation effects due to this pricing scheme. However, we indirectly find an optimal location
of the cordon (αẑO) through the endogenously determined optimal size of the CBD (ẑO).
8We suppose that the marginal productivity of labor is non-increasing in line with Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg
(2002).
9Agglomeration economies exist in CBDs, but thanks to new information and communication technologies,
decentralization of jobs occurs within the city (Baum-Snow and Pavan, 2012).
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CBD. We assume that wages are fixed by firms. The maximization of (14) with respect to labor
time TLi implies the following labor demand:
pAiγT
γ−1
Li = ωi (15)
so that Πi = (1− γ)pAiT γLi = (1− γ)[pAi]
1
1−γ [γ/ωC ]
γ
1−γ , where we have inserted (15) into (14). In
equilibrium, ΠC = ΠS leads to:
ωC = A
1
γ
CωS
Hence, µ = ωS/ωC = A
−1/γ
C . As a consequence, the wage gap between business centers depends
on the magnitude of agglomeration economies AC and diseconomies of scale γ.
2.6 Welfare
Finally, we can derive the Welfare that represents the aggregate indirect utility within the closed
city10. The sum of the indirect utilities of tenant workers, the land rent incomes of absentee
landlords are an integral part of this welfare. Under a no-toll equilibrium, welfare is expressed as
follows:
W ∗ =
ma
h
[∫ y
0
ωi (1− T (x)) dx−
∫ y
0
t0xdx
]
− ALRj
+
[
ALRj −m
∫ y
0
RAdx
]
+m
∫ y
0
RAdx
with:
ALRj = m
∫ y
0
R(x)dx
Land rent incomes are the aggregate land rents paid by tenant workers minus agricultural land
rents RA redistributed to landlords living outside the city. Finally, agricultural landowners benefit
from agricultural land rent incomes. The purpose of this article is to analyze the impacts of the
road pricing schemes on welfare and on the city structure. Furthermore, one of the main goals is
to determine the conditions under which aggregate welfare is maximized within the closed city.
10The first part of the aggregate welfare is the difference between aggregate incomes and aggregate congestion,
commuting and housing costs in a city (Wheaton, 2004). The second part is the distribution of rents to absentee
landlords.
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3 The monocentric city
A standard monocentric spatial configuration is used to determine how our policy interventions
(i) are capitalized in land rents and (ii) affect welfare. The welfare of the closed city is evaluated
under an unpriced congestion framework and three different tax implementations (Pigouvian tax,
flat tax and cordon toll). Finally, we compare the policies’ impacts.
One single business district (the CBD) gathers all of the city’s jobs. Each worker lives in the
residential areas within the city. The city border y solves the total population constraint given by:
L = m
∫ y
0
ldx (16)
in which l is the population density at each residential location x with l = a/h. Solving (16) by
using l = a/h yields the city radius size in equilibrium:
yM =
Lh
ma
(17)
when all jobs are located in the CBD (see Appendix A). We observe that the city border decreases
with respect to both the number m of built-up areas and the proportion a of residential areas at
each unit of distance. The city fringe increases with the total population. Note also that a decrease
in housing floor space (δ < 1) per unit of land leads to urban sprawl. In this closed city, the travel
time function τ(x) = τ0 + τ1fM(x) depends on the cumulative flow of users at x given by:
fM(x) =
{ ∫ yM
x
a
h(1−a)dz
0 if x = yM
The total commuting time of an individual living at distance x from the CBD is expressed as
follows:
TM(x) =
∫
x
0
[
τ0 + τ1
∫ yM
x
a
h(1− a)dz
]
dx
leading to:
TM(x) = xτ0 + τ1
a
h(1− a)
[
yMx− x
2
2
]
≥ xτ0 (18)
The free-flow travel time xτ0 and the congestion delay τ1
a
h(1−a)
[
yMx− x22
]
are monotonic curves
(x ≤ yM) and can be represented as follows:
Note that our congestion delay cost function is increasing at a decreasing rate. The marginal
travel time cost is higher towards the CBD than outwards from the CBD. Accordingly, the op-
portunity cost of the commuting time is higher near the city center than in the outskirts. An
individual living near the CBD will have a lower commuting time due to an infinitesimal move
(x − dx) than that of an individual living near the city border. Living near the border implies
11
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Figure 1: Evolution of the components of the total commuting time function with respect to the
distance to the CBD in a monocentric city configuration.
high transportation costs. Congestion delay costs increase with x, but land rents are cheaper in
the outskirts. The effect of a on the congestion externality is unclear. Indeed, when a increases,
the city limits shrink, which implies a decrease in traveled distances. However, the road’s capacity
(1− a) falls, leading to an ambiguous result for a given population density.
Homogeneous workers choose their living places with respect to their budget constraints. Housing
rents and commuting costs vary with the distance from the CBD. They maximize their indirect
utility. RA is the agricultural value of land at the city limits. In equilibrium, the bid rent at each
location is given by R(x) = max {ΨM(x), RA}. The bid rent Ψ(x) must solve ∂V (x)/∂x = 0. All
households share the same indirect utility. In equilibrium, the distribution of urban dwellers is
such that V (x) = V (y) regardless of x. Hence, there are no incentives to relocate in a no-toll
spatial equilibrium. Then, we plug (18) into the indirect utility using (17); hence, we obtain the
individual welfare in equilibrium:
VM = ωC − Lh
ma
[
ωCτ0 + t0 +
ωCτ1L
2m(1− a)
]
− RAh
a
(19)
Using (18) and indirect utility (19), we obtain the bid rent function in equilibrium11:
ΨM(x) =
a [2h(1− a)(ωCτ0 + t0)(yM − x) + ωCτ1a(yM − x)2]
2h2(1− a) +RA (20)
At each unit of distance, the land rent capitalizes the opportunity cost of commuting time, the
monetary transports costs and the external costs imposed on all commuters. The land rent de-
creases with respect to the distance x from the CBD. The bid rent equals the agricultural land
rent RA when an individual lives at the city border (x = yM). When a increases marginally, the
effects are unclear, as demonstrated for the congestion externality. On the one hand, land rents are
11The rent gradient (i.e., the partial derivative of (20) with respect to x) is negative, which is in line with other
monocentric models (Tikoudis et al., 2015; Verhoef, 2005). In equilibrium, there are no incentives to relocate within
the city.
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lower due to the greater housing floor space per unit of distance, but on the other hand, the road’s
capacity decreases, leading mechanically to more congestion. Hence, longer congestion delays raise
land rents due to the lack of road capacity.
The indirect utility includes income net of pecuniary transport costs (free-flow travel) and land
rents (ωC − yM(ωCτ0 + t0) − RAha ). This latter term is called private welfare, as it represents the
consumption of private goods. The second one refers to the congestion externality related to the
number of commuters on the road and the road’s width
[
ωCτ1ay
2
M
2h(1−a)
]
. Standard calculations reveal
that the indirect utility is increasing at a decreasing rate with the number of roads m connected
to the CBD, as well as with the total capacity of the transportation network m(1− a). Note that
a smaller city (i.e., yM diminishes) reduces the total commuting cost as long as the population
density does not adjust. It is clear that a marginal increase in commuting costs and land rents
diminishes utility regardless of whether the population density or the number of roads m is given.
A growing population has a negative effect on welfare, as it raises the number of commuters and,
therefore, the opportunity cost of commuting time through a rise in congestion delay costs. Ur-
ban sprawl (i.e., the marginal expansion of yM) diminishes individual welfare as well, since the
maximum traveled distance to the CBD increases.
Welfare and road pricing schemes In a monocentric city, different urban policies do not
affect the total congestion level as we consider individuals that have inelastic demand for transport.
They do not affect welfare because taxes are redistributed, but they affect each economic agent as
a transfer of income12. The no-toll equilibrium is used as a reference point to discuss our results.
Aggregate welfare WM is calculated under each configuration: (i) the no-toll equilibrium with
congestion, (ii) the Pigouvian tax and (iii) the outcome with a flat tax and a cordon toll13. A tax
increases welfare within the city, as the aggregate land rent and toll revenues are returned as a
lump sum and remain in the urban economy. The Pigouvian tax, a flat kilometer tax and a cordon
toll yield a same welfare level as a no-toll equilibrium. For given city limits and housing size, the
three road pricing schemes differ only in their revenue distribution. In the absence of a lump-sum
redistribution of land rents, tenant workers are worse off than in an unpriced congestion context.
Indeed, land rents capitalize both congestion externalities and tax levels, leading bids rent to rise
at all locations as long as the city limits do not change. Landlords would benefit more from a
pricing scheme that yields the highest land value. The second-best policies yield higher bids rent
than those in the no-toll equilibrium at all locations as long as housing size and city limits remain
fixed (Appendix C). With the flat tax, workers who live at the outskirts pay higher prices due to
a longer travel distance than those living close to the CBD. Accordingly, workers living close to
the CBD benefit more from the revenue return scheme than do those living near the city limits.
Thus, they can bid more to live closer to the CBD, explaining why second-best bids are higher
than in equilibrium. Regarding the cordon toll implementation, households living in the cordon
zone face lower prices given the congestion externality they impose on other road users, while those
living outside the central zone face higher prices. A cordon toll leads bids rent to increase even
in presence of a revenue return scheme. To avoid the toll, households may locate closer to their
12The calculations are reported in Appendix C.
13A cordon toll is set at location αyM within the monocentric city before entering the CBD. Only workers living
beyond αyM incur this fixed charge to commute to their workplace.
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workplaces when housing demand adjusts. In conclusion, we can say that congestion externality
pricing does not reduce travel time due to the inelastic demand for commutes. However, the road
pricing schemes differ according to the distribution of the tax burden and the overall beneficiaries.
In the next section, we will analyze how the location of jobs affects congestion and demand for
commuting via a wage differential between CBD and SBDs within the polycentric city.
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4 Decentralization of jobs and welfare
Traffic congestion and road pricing schemes are now analyzed under a polycentric setting. Jobs are
able to relocate in an SBD within the city and wages are fixed. Our main objective is to understand
the evolution of urban congestion and welfare by relocating jobs and introducing different taxes.
4.1 The polycentric city
A worker deciding to locate close to the CBD earns a gross wage rate ωC above the wage ωS
offered by firms in the SBDs. Each business district is surrounded by road infrastructure and
residential areas. No worker has an incentive to move from her workplace or residence in the
spatial equilibrium. All households live at each location x such that dV (x)/dx = 0. In this spatial
organization, ẑ is the right limit of the area formed by workers commuting to the CBD (i.e., the
left limit of the built-up area constituted by individuals working in the SBD). The location of
SBDs is determined endogenously through the location of ẑ. Individuals locate around each SBD
symmetrically. Hence, the endogenous location of the SBD zS is the midpoint of the area between
ẑ and the city limit y. Therefore:
zS =
y + ẑ
2
(21)
Notice that the bids rent at y and ẑ are equal to the opportunity costs of land RA. The equilibrium
border when the city is polycentric reaches14:
y =
Lh
am
(22)
The city limits are identical to the monocentric structure when jobs relocate to the SBDs (y = yM).
As housing demand remains fixed, the structural density is the same, and y is unchanged. When
jobs relocate to an SBD, the size of the CBD decreases from yM to ẑ; hence, workers incur lower
transport costs (in terms of both time and money).
Congestion delay and traffic flow. The total commuting time of an individual living at x
between the CBD and the limit ẑ is derived in the same way as in the previous urban structure.
Here, the CBD limit substitutes yM for ẑ. Regarding traffic flows toward the SBDs, the commuting
time between the SBD zS and the border y is expressed as follows:
T (x) =
∫
x
zS
[τ0 + τ1
∫ y
x
a
h(1− a)dz]dx when x > zS
leading to:
T (x) = (x− zS)τ0 + τ1a
h(1− a) [y(x− zS) +
z2S − x2
2
] ≥ (x− zS)τ0 (23)
Notice that whether zS rises, the total commuting time to this location decreases because the
CBD limit expands leading to shrinkage of the SBD area. As there is symmetry around an SBD, a
14The details of these calculations are reported in Appendix D1.
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worker living at location x between ẑ and zS or between zS and y incurs the same travel distance
and congestion delay (see equation 23). Therefore, the subsequent analytical properties focus on
workers living at the right side of the SBD. Commuters use one single mode of transport to travel,
and they obtain the same level of utility within the city. A worker living in the area between
the CBD and ẑ has no economic incentives to work in a SBD. No wasteful commuting occurs in
equilibrium. Each traffic flow towards the SBD starts from ẑ and y. This means that congestion
costs at these points may be lower than in the monocentric configuration. Indeed, a commuter
incurs a maximum time delay
τ1ay2M
2h(1−a) at yM when one single business center exists. Each worker
enters a road where the maximum time delay falls to τ1aẑ
2
2h(1−a) (ẑ < yM). Trivial calculations show
that the congestion externality decreases for each commuter (see Appendix E). The maximum
traveled distance diminishes, and the traffic flow is split between the business districts. Therefore,
for a given density, each worker is better off when firms relocate. Ceteris paribus, congestion costs
will rise for inhabitants working in the CBD regardless of whether ẑ or y increases. The following
proposition summarizes.
Proposition 1. When a share of jobs relocates to a SBD at the edge of a city, the congestion
externality level decreases for each commuter.
SBD Size. As there are two business districts, a wage gap exists between them in accordance with
empirical evidence (see White, 1999; Timothy and Wheaton, 2001). Hence, we define ωS = µωC
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with 0 < µ < 1 corresponding to the spread between the two business districts. Furthermore, a
worker commuting to the SBD may incur a lower transport cost than one commuting to the CBD.
This gives the worker an incentive to work in that subcenter of the city. The size of the CBD ẑ
is determined by an indifference condition. For a worker living at ẑ, the traveled distance to the
workplace is equivalent: she is indifferent between commuting to the CBD and commuting to the
SBD, yielding the following expression:
ωC
[
1− (ẑτ0 + τ1aẑ
2
2h(1− a))
]
− t0ẑ = ωS
[
1− (zS − ẑ)τ0 − τ1a(zS − ẑ)
2
2h(1− a)
]
− t0(zS − ẑ) (24)
The size of the CBD ẑ is smaller than the city limits y in this model. Individuals accept work
from firms in SBDs when the gross wage ωS offered is strictly above the CBD’s wage net of total
transport costs (i.e., the opportunity cost of commuting, congestion delays and pecuniary costs)
in a monocentric city. Employers benefit from this relocation of jobs within a city because they
pay lower wages. Workers face shorter commutes and pay lower land rents. Whatever the gross
wage ωC offered by firms in the CBD, the decentralization of jobs holds for a certain level of ωS.
As a consequence, the free market equilibrium yields a non-linear expression of the CBD border
ẑ(µ). For greater clarity, τ0 is assumed to be equal to zero
16. Hence:
ẑ∗(µ) =
−3t0(1− a)− µωCτ1L2m + 2(1− a)
√
∆
ωC(2− µ/2)τ1a (25)
with:
∆ ≡
[
3t0
2
+
µωCτ1L
4m(1− a)
]2
+
ωC(4− µ)τ1L
2m(1− a)
[
ωC(1− µ)ma
L
+
t0
2
+
µωCτ1L
8m(1− a)
]
> 0
15µ = A
− 1γ
C =
ωS
ωC
16Calculations for ẑ(µ) without this assumption are reported in Appendix D2.
16
in which (21) and (22) have been inserted. ẑ is implicitly defined by the indifference condition
(24). The influence area of the SBD (the number of individuals working in the SBD) rises with µ
and reaches a maximum when µ = 1 (y−ẑ
∗(µ)
2
= 2y
3
). The attractiveness of a peripheral business
district depends on the average gross wage observed within this SBD. Each worker considers her
wage net of total transport and residential costs. For a given city size, a polycentric structure with
a prominent business center enables shorter home-to-work distances and reduces pressure on land
rents at and close to the CBD. Therefore, transport and rent costs decrease for each commuter.
Urban traffic is divided into three flows, and no cross-border commuting between the business
districts occurs in equilibrium. As a consequence, all commuters in the city face fewer congestion
delays than they would in a monocentric one, but they do not benefit from the most efficient travel
time.
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Figure 2: Bids rent in equilibrium near each business district and the locations of the CBD (x = 0)
and the SBD (x = zS) within a polycentric city configuration.
The equilibrium land rent at each location is given by: R(x) = max{Ψ0(x),ΨP (x), RA}. Ψ0(x)
(resp., ΨP (x)) is the bid rent of individuals working in the CBD (resp., SBD). ∂V (x)/∂x = 0
implies:
Ψ0(x) =
a [2h(1− a)(ωCτ0 + t0)(ẑ∗(µ)− x) + aωCτ1(ẑ∗(µ)− x)2]
2h2(1− a) +RA
and:
ΨP (x) =
a
[
2h(1− a)(ωCτ0 + t0)(y−ẑ∗(µ)2 − |zS − x|) + aωCτ1(y−ẑ
∗(µ)
2
− |zS − x|)2
]
2h2(1− a) +RA
Bids rent decrease with the distance to the business districts (see Figure 2). Furthermore, the bids
rent remain identical for all x ∈ [zS, y] when an SBD is created. Consequently, the average land
rent decreases, but the city limits are unchanged when jobs relocate to the edge of the city.
4.2 Equilibrium allocation and optimal location of jobs
The no-toll equilibrium is used as a reference to compare optimal and equilibrium locations of the
SBD. In equilibrium, the welfare (i.e., the aggregate indirect utilities) of the polycentric city is
17
expressed as follows:
WS(ẑ
∗) =
ma
h
[
ωC ẑ
∗(1− µ) + µωCy −
(µωCτ0 + t0)
(
y2 − ẑ∗2)
2
− (ωCτ0 + t0)ẑ
∗2
2
− ωCτ1a
[
4ẑ∗3 + µ(y − ẑ∗)3]
12h(1− a)
]
Hence, inserting equation (25) gives us the welfare in equilibrium (Appendix D3). Notice that when
ẑ∗(µ) = y, the urban economy recaptures the monocentric setting, as y = yM and WS(µ) = WM .
Because the size of the SBD depends on the wage gap between the business districts, it is crucial
to analyze the effects of jobs decentralization on welfare according to the level of (µ). Indeed, we
have:
WS(ẑ
∗)−WM = ma
h
[∫ ẑ∗
0
VC dx+ 2
∫ y
zS
VS dx−
∫ yM
0
VM dx
]
+ ALRP − ALRM
Job relocation to a SBD has an ambiguous effect on welfare. The effect depends strongly on the
magnitude of the wage differential between business districts. Note that in equilibrium without
taxation, the welfare of inhabitants working in the CBD improves when the urban economy shifts
from a monocentric to a polycentric configuration. The relationship is more complex for inhabitants
living near the SBD. On the one hand, they face both shorter travel distances and less congestion.
Thus, their opportunity costs of commuting decrease because their income ωS is smaller than ωC .
On the other hand, they pay the same rent RA, and the difference in individual utility depends
strongly on the wage gap. Indeed, the wage gap is positive for polycentric city’s inhabitants.
However, the economic shift has no incentive if the wage discrepancy offsets the opportunity costs
of commuting and congestion delays. To understand how the wage gap and commuting time costs
affect aggregate welfare, the analysis considers the case where the wage rates observed in the CBD
and the SBDs are equal. Then, we consider a more realistic case where workers earn a higher
hourly wage in the CBD than in the SBDs. For each case, a free market equilibrium is solved, and
aggregate welfare is maximized by a benevolent planner who sets the optimal size of the SBD.
Specific case with no wage gap between the CBD and the SBDs. First, a simple way
to disentangle the different effects at work is to equalize the wage rates of the business centers:
ωC = ωS(µ = 1). Workers living near the CBD (resp., the SBD) face a maximum distance equal to
ẑ (resp., y−ẑ
2
), and traffic is divided into three flows. Hence, there is lower congestion on the roads
when jobs relocate to an SBD within a closed city. In equilibrium, inserting µ = 1 into (25) leads
to ẑ∗ = y
3
, so the free market size of the residential zone near the SBD is equal to (y − ẑ∗) = 2y
3
.
This result is identical to the optimal size of the left endpoint of the SBD (ẑ∗∗) when welfare is
maximized by a benevolent planner17. As a result, we have:
ẑ∗ = ẑO =
y
3
(26)
The free market solution is identical to the optimal location of the CBD limit when the congestion
externality is not internalized, provided that no wage gap exists between the business districts.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to check that welfare in a polycentric city (WS(ẑ
O)) with an
17 ∂WS(ẑ)
∂ẑ = 0 leads to a single maximum for WS(ẑ) when ẑ ∈ [0, y], which reaches ẑO = y3 . The details of these
calculations are reported in Appendix D4.
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equal wage rate is higher than that in a monocentric setting (WM) (Appendix D4). It follows that
each parameter that marginally increases the population density (m, a) yields a higher differential
in favor of the polycentric city, all things being equal. The free market equilibrium and optimal
solution of ẑ yield similar welfare, which is better than that for the monocentric city. Note that
welfare in a polycentric city is decreasing when y
3
< ẑ ≤ y18. In other words, welfare is increasing
as the size of the CBD decreases in favor of the SBD until ẑ reaches y
3
.
Proposition 2. Assume that there is no wage gap (AC = 1) and that welfare in equilibrium
is maximized when ẑ∗ = y
3
when a share of firms relocates to an SBD. In this case, the free market
size is equal to the optimal size.
Proof. See Appendix D4.
As a consequence, jobs relocation within a closed city makes workers better off than they would
be in a monocentric city. It is straightforward to check that ∆W > 0:
∆W ≡ WS(ẑ)−WM = mωCτ
2
1a
2(y − ẑ)(y + ẑ)2
4h2(1− a) > 0 (27)
For all ẑ < y, the polycentric city is welfare improving, since the maximum distance for home-to-
work commutes is shorter than yM
19. In addition, workers incur a lower level of congestion for each
commuting trip when the city size y is unchanged. Thus, the efficient commuting pattern (the
minimum home-to-work distance) is achieved when ωC = ωS in comparison with the monocentric
pattern20.
General case with positive agglomeration externalities. We now return to the case where
ωS = µωC with (0 < µ < 1). The expression of the free market CBD limit ẑ
∗ is highly non-linear
and implicitly defined by the indifference condition for a worker living at an equidistant point
between the two business centers. ẑ∗ is expressed as follows:
ωC
[
1− ẑτ0 − τ1aẑ
2
2h(1− a)
]
− t0ẑ = ωS
[
1− (y − zS)τ0 − τ1a(y − zS)
2
2h(1− a)
]
− t0(y − zS) (28)
The size of the residential zone from which workers commute to the SBD (y− ẑ∗) depends mainly
on the wage gap between the business centers. A wage rate growth in the CBD leads to its ex-
pansion at the expense of the size of the SBDs. Standard calculations show that the CBD’s size
is smaller with free-flow travel time τ0, under the three congestion pricing schemes and when the
18We have WS(ẑ = 0) > WS(ẑ = y)) and
∂WS
∂ẑ
∣∣
ẑ=0
> 0 > ∂WS∂ẑ
∣∣
ẑ=y
. In addition, ∂WS(ẑ)∂ẑ has a single extremum
when ẑ ∈ [0, y], which is a maximum.
19Note that when no CBD exists (i.e., ẑ = 0), the SBD is located in the middle of the total residential area (i.e.,y2 ),
as our model is symmetric around the CBD located at x = 0. This case is a duocentric city where welfare is higher
than in a monocentric city, even when the location of the left endpoint of the SBD does not yield an equilibrium
or optimal solution. A particular polycentric pattern leads to the same level of welfare when ẑ = y
√
5−1
2 over
[0, y]. However, traffic is split into two flows, which insufficiently decreases the congestion delay for each commuter.
Indeed, only one solution assures that each commuter can minimize her extra travel time (see Proposition 2).
20Note that the city is divided into three equal parts when ωC = ωS with ẑ =
y
3 , and the SBD’s size (y − ẑ)
equals 2y3 .
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border y decreases. Workers favor commuting to the SBD when the free-flow travel speed 1/τ0 di-
minishes. Similarly, the CBD’s size decreases when the slope (τ1) of the congestion curve increases
(see Appendix D6 for the details of the calculations). When the available floor space (δ > 1) per
land unit grows, the CBD’s size ẑ∗ diminishes, and y decreases with the fraction of residential area
a. Conversely, city size grows when the lot size h increases. Note that a marginal increase in a
leads to a more compact city but lowers the road’s capacity, yielding higher congestion delay costs
for a given population density.
The determination of an optimal solution by a benevolent planner considers the maximization
of aggregate welfare so that ∂WS(ẑ)
∂ẑ
= 0 yields a non-linear ẑO (see Appendix D7). In this case, the
optimal solution and the free market equilibrium are not similar. When µ = 1, we revert to the
previous case where the optimal and free market sizes are equal (ẑO = ẑ∗). Then, we determine
whether the free market size of the area where individuals live near the CBD is too small or too
large.Welfare in the polycentric city can be written as follows21:
WS =
ma
h
[∫ ẑ
0
VC dx+ 2
∫ y
zS
VS dx
]
+ ALRP (29)
At the optimum, ∂WS
∂ẑ
∣∣
ẑ=ẑO
= 0 because welfare has reached its maximum. Furthermore, welfare
WS is a concave curve on the interval [0, y] since
∂2WS
∂2ẑ
< 0 (see Figure 3 and Appendix D6).
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Figure 3: The evolution of welfare with respect to ẑ within a polycentric city configuration (from
the CBD x = 0 to the city limits y).
Hence, to find the location of the CBD limit in equilibrium relative to the optimum, we derive
welfare with respect to ẑ conditional on ẑ = ẑ∗:
∂WS
∂ẑ
∣∣∣∣
ẑ=ẑ∗
=
[
ma
h
(
(y − ẑ∗)∂VS
∂ẑ
+ ẑ∗
∂VC
∂ẑ
)
+
∂ALRP
∂ẑ
∣∣∣∣
ẑ=ẑ∗
]
< 0 (30)
As a result, the free market size of the CBD is greater than optimal. In other words, the free market
SBD area is smaller than the optimum under positive agglomeration and congestion externalities22.
21When we derive WS with respect to ẑ, there are no price effect at the aggregate level since all land rents paid
by tenant workers are received by absentee landlords.
22Note that we have ∂WS∂ẑ
∣∣
ẑ=ẑ∗ = 0 when there are no market failures in our urban model. The size of the CBD
in equilibrium is identical to the optimum.
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The intuition is as follows. When the decentralization of jobs occurs, land rents and congestion
delays decrease, on average, as a share of workers relocates closer to the new SBD. As a consequence,
workers who earned wage rate ωC have an incentive to remain in the residential zone close to the
CBD because their net wage has increased. Then, for a marginal increase of ẑ, the total commuting
time for a worker living near the limit of the residential zone is similar when she moves from x
to x + dx23. Hence, with a higher wage rate offered in the CBD, most inhabitants commute to
the CBD instead of the SBD without taking into account the marginal social costs they impose
on other commuters. Accordingly, the size of residential zone near the CBD is larger than the
optimum. Regarding the optimal size, it is straightforward to check that y
3
< ẑO < ẑ∗ as:
∂WS
∂ẑ
∣∣∣∣
ẑ= y
3
> 0 (31)
Briefly, the optimal size of the CBD is larger than ẑ = y
3
and smaller than ẑ∗.
Proposition 3. A free market equilibrium yields a CBD that is too large when there is a
market failure and a positive agglomeration externality.
Proof See Appendix D6.
In the next section, we focus on the spatial and economic impacts of internalizing the external
costs of congestion according to three different road pricing schemes. We evaluate their efficiency
by comparing the tax-induced size of the CBD and the optimal CBD size.
5 Polycentric city and road pricing schemes
The free market equilibrium under a wage gap yields an inefficient outcome for a polycentric city.
Here, our objective is to achieve the optimally sized SBD or to bring ẑ closer to that optimal
size. Three road pricing schemes are evaluated separately. Each worker pays a tax that affects
her income, internalizing the congestion externality imposed on other road users. The tax τk(x) is
inserted into the budget constraint of each household, as well as into the revenue return scheme
and aggregate land rent redistributions, leading to the following individual welfare:
VS(x) = ωi(1− T (x))− τk(x) + G¯S + ALRP
L
− R(x)h
a
− t0x with i ∈ [C, S] (32)
Land rent is given by R(x) = max{Ψ0(x),ΨP (x), RA}. Ψ0(x) (resp., ΨP (x)) is the bid rent of
individuals working in the CBD (resp., SBD). ∂V (x)/∂x = 0 implies that:
Ψ0(x) =
a [2h(1− a) [(ωCτ0 + t0)(ẑ − x) + τk(ẑ)− τk(x)] + aωCτ1(ẑ − x)2]
2h2(1− a) +RA,
and:
ΨP (x) =
a
[
2h(1− a)
[
(ωSτ0 + t0)(
y−ẑ
2 − |zS − x|) + τk(y)− τk(|zS − x|)
]
+ aωSτ1(
y−ẑ
2 − |zS − x|)2
]
2h2(1− a) +RA
23In our previous calculations, note that ẑ∗ is larger than (y− ẑ∗), and for a longer distance traveled between the
CBD and ẑ∗, workers experience a marginal negative effect on their indirect utility, which has a larger magnitude
than the positive effect experienced by those working in the small SBD. Hence, ẑ∗ ∂VC∂ẑ > (y − ẑ∗)∂WS∂ẑ .
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Note that each pricing scheme affects the endogenous CBD size ẑ, which is recalculated to fit the
model. Welfare in the polycentric city with taxes can now be defined as follows:
WS =
ma
h
[∫ ẑ
0
VC dx+ 2
∫ y
zS
VS dx
]
+Gk
+
[
ALRP −m
∫ y
0
RAdx
]
+m
∫ y
0
RAdx
Each commuter pays a charge for using her car but benefits from the redistribution of tax revenues
and aggregate land rents, since road pricing schemes are capitalized in land rents. Absentee and
agricultural landlords continue to receive their revenues. The impacts of these second-best pricing
schemes are examined and the results presented.
The Pigouvian tax First, a Pigouvian tax is implemented as a location-constrained first-best
policy24. Indeed, a benevolent planner decides to fix the location of the SBDs in optimum while
we implement this tax when ẑ is determined endogenously. This tax must adjust to correctly
internalize the behavior of workers who are free to choose their residential locations. A priori,
these free decisions would prevent this road pricing scheme from achieving the optimum. Each
road user is priced at the exact marginal social cost she imposes on others for a given location and
a given workplace. The toll level is expressed as follows:
τP (x) =
{ ∫ x
0
ωCτ1a
h(1−a)(ẑ − x), when 0 < x ≤ ẑ∫ x
zS
ωSτ1a
h(1−a)(y − x), when zS < x ≤ y
(33)
Hence, the tax level for a commuter living in x and commuting to the CBD is ωCτ1a
h(1−a) [ẑx − x2/2].
Between ẑ and zS, urban dwellers pay the same tax as those living between zS and y because jobs
located in zS are in the middle of the residential area. Hence, using the tax level in the indifference
condition for the location of the CBD limit ẑ yields25:
ωC
[
1− ẑτ0 − τ1aẑ
2
h(1− a)
]
− t0ẑ = ωS
[
1− (y − ẑ
2
)τ0 −
τ1a(
y−ẑ
2
)2
h(1− a)
]
− t0(y − ẑ
2
) (34)
Then, we have the following welfare level:
WP (τP ) =
ma
h
[∫ ẑ
0
ωC [1− T (x)]− t0(x)dx+ 2
∫ y
zS
ωS [1− T (x)]− t0(x− zS)dx
]
To find the location of the CBD limit ẑP , we derive (26) with respect to ẑ knowing that ẑ = ẑP ,
leading to:
∂WS
∂ẑ
∣∣∣∣
ẑ=ẑP
=
ma
h
[
(ωSτ0 + t0)(
3ẑ − y
2
)
]
> 0, (35)
24A first-best policy would fix the residential location of each household and the location of the SBD simultane-
ously.
25see Appendix F1 for details of calculations.
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as ẑ > y
3
. Hence, the Pigouvian tax fails to clear the market due to the free location decisions of
workers26. They earn higher wages in the CBD, yielding an equilibrium CBD size that is too large
to correctly manage traffic congestion. Including an extra marginal external cost reduces their net
wage. They relocate near the SBD, overweighting the marginal loss of remaining near the CBD.
As a consequence, the limit of the residential area from which inhabitants commute to the CBD
is lower than the optimal location ẑO. The CBD limit under this kind of tax is lower than both
the equilibrium and the optimal location. The hierarchy is as follows:
ẑP < ẑ
O < ẑ∗ (36)
As a result, a location-constrained first-best policy excessively internalizes the congestion exter-
nality by encouraging SBD overextension within the polycentric city.
Proposition 4. A Pigouvian tax fails to reach the optimum, yielding a CBD that is too
small when there is a market failure and a positive agglomeration externality.
Proof See Appendix F .
The flat tax The following toll is imposed simultaneously on each driver and depends only on
the traveled distance:
τF (x) = tFx (37)
The CBD limit ẑ is now implicitly defined by the following expression including the flat tax incurred
by each individual:
ωC
[
1− ẑτ0 − τ1aẑ
2
2h(1− a)
]
− (t0 + tF )ẑ = ωS
[
1− (y − ẑ
2
)τ0 −
τ1a(
y−ẑ
2
)2
2h(1− a)
]
− (t0 + tF )(y − ẑ
2
)
All commuters face the same tax; hence, workers living near the left endpoint of the SBD may be
underpriced and those living near the SBD or the CBD may be overpriced. In addition, workers
benefit from the revenue return scheme and receive the same lump-sum payment from the collected
taxes. At the aggregate level, we have the following welfare:
WF (τF ) =
ma
h
[∫ ẑ
0
ωC [1− T (x)]− t0(x)dx+ 2
∫ y
zS
ωS [1− T (x)]− t0(x− zS)dx
]
Deriving WS with respect to ẑ conditional on ẑ = ẑF to find the location of ẑF yields:
∂WS
∂ẑ
∣∣∣∣
ẑ=ẑF
≶ 0 (38)
Thus, the location of the CBD limit when each commuter pays a flat tax could be greater or
lower than the optimal location of ẑO. The location depends mainly on the wage gap between the
business centers before the implementation of the flat tax. As a consequence, the size of the SBD
matters, but the optimum will never be achieved unless the wage rates are equal in both business
centers.
26There is no reason why ẑ should be lower that or equal to y3 . When this Pigouvian tax is implemented, there
is only one solution yielding ẑ = y3 , namely, when AC = 1.
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The cordon toll A cordon toll is set at location αẑ within the CBD area where some inhabitants
work. Each commuter living between αẑ and ẑ pays a fixed fee to pass the cordon. Workers living
inside the cordon are not charged; therefore, they do not pay for the congestion externality they
impose on other commuters. The fixed fee to enter the cordon is captured in the rents of those
living near the CBD. Hence, there exists a discontinuity in the rent bid at the tollgate location.
Moreover, inhabitants living in the SBD area do not pay road taxes and benefit from both tax and
aggregate land rent redistribution. The CBD limit is implicitly defined by the following expression:
ωC
[
1− ẑτ0 − τ1aẑ
2
2h(1− a)
]
− t0ẑ − c = ωS
[
1− (y − ẑ
2
)τ0 −
τ1a(
y−ẑ
2
)2
2h(1− a)
]
− t0(y − ẑ
2
)
A priori, in this case, the implementation of a cordon toll induces a decrease in the CBD size due
to the fee incurred by a few workers living between αẑCT and ẑCT . Commuters living near the
cordon will relocate closer to the SBD until it becomes more expensive than living close to the
CBD. The welfare function WCT (τCT ) is expressed as follows
27:
WCT (τCT ) =
ma
h
[∫ ẑ
0
ωC [1− T (x)]− t0(x)dx+ 2
∫ y
zS
ωS [1− T (x)]− t0(x− zS)dx
]
Deriving WS with respect to ẑ conditional on ẑ = ẑCT to find the location of ẑCT yields:
∂WS
∂ẑ
∣∣∣∣
ẑ=ẑCT
=
ma
h
[
c+ (ωSτ0 + t0)(
3ẑ − y
2
) +
ωSτ1a(y − ẑ)2
8h(1− a)
]
≶ 0 (39)
As a result, the cordon toll does not achieve the optimal location of the SBD. The location of the
CBD limit may be lower or greater than the optimal location according to the initial wage gap
between the subcenters and the transport costs incurred by individuals (see Appendix F3). Since
the location of the cordon is exogenous, the fixed fee (c) may be too small or too high as well.
Indeed, a fee that overprices commuters yield a small CBD and a fee that underprices them leads
to a too large CBD. It is straightforward that an increase in the available land for housing lowers
the road capacity leading to a small CBD. Conversely, an increase in the lot size spreads out the
CBD for a given road capacity.
Proposition 5. The flat tax and the cordon toll do not perform better than the Pigouvian tax.
They yield a CBD that is either too low or too large depending on initial wage gap between the
business districts and the amount of the respective pricing scheme.
Proof See Appendix F .
Finally, we need to compare the results of the policies with the help of numerical simulations
because it is difficult to find convenient analytical solutions.
27The details of the calculations are reported in Appendix F3.
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6 Comparisons between road pricing schemes
This section simulates a closed city with a fixed limit y = 2, where the total population is fixed
at L = 2 and the agricultural land rent is RA =
1
4
for a given wage gap 1
µ
= 2. This wage gap
is chosen since the polycentric city exists under that condition for all case studies. Table 1 shows
the different parameter values used for the scenario28. Parameter calibration is in accordance with
the transport costs hierarchy used in other numerical simulations in the literature (Tikoudis et al.,
2015; Zhang and Kockelman, 2016a) (i.e., τ0 > τ1).
Table 1: Calibrated parameters
L RA m h δ a τ0 τ1 t0 ωS
1
µ
2 1
4
2 1 1 0.5 1
5
1
6
0 2 2
The following parts present the results of simulations conducted for the polycentric city. The
numerical settings here guarantee that all individuals benefit from the same amount of toll and
rent revenues and share the same indirect utility V¯ at all locations under each road pricing scheme.
CBD limit Analytically, this model has demonstrated that a small increase in the wage gap
between the CBD and the SBD expands the CBD’s area, as measured by ẑ, in equilibrium. How-
ever, the simulations show that the CBD limit under each road pricing scheme is always lower
than in equilibrium without taxation. Therefore, they never reach the ẑO where welfare reaches
an extremum. Land use patterns are affected by second-best policies when each business center
offers different wage rates. The endogenous left endpoint of the SBD has changed under a Pigou-
vian tax (PT), a flat tax (F) and a cordon toll(C). For any 1
µ
> 1, the polycentric city becomes
monocentric, reaching the level 1
µ
with second-best pricing policies, except for the Pigouvian tax.
In this case, the polycentric city always exists even if the CBD is the most attractive workplace.
When 1
µ
approaches infinity, the CBD’s size reaches a limit lower than y in the simulations. With
a flat tax and a cordon toll, a polycentric city prevails provided that 1
µ
is lower than approximately
4.31 and 4.03, respectively.
Table 2: Simulated results of CBD size within a polycentric city according to each road pricing
scheme. (1/µ = 2).
No toll Optimum τP τF τCT
CBD’s size, ẑ 1.577 1.467 1.305 1.489 1.506
In other terms, a subcenter no longer has economic interests, as the gross wage offered ωS is
almost 5 times smaller than ωC under a flat tax. Internalizing the congestion externality at any
given location mitigates the desirability of traveling to a unique business center. In a way, these
28The calibration of all parameters is consistent with the analytical model such that indirect utilities and aggregate
welfare are strictly positive.
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findings are in accordance with the non-monocentric model of Zhang and Kockelman (2016b), al-
though our model does not consider endogenous city size. Congestion costs yield higher land rents
near the CBD, as each worker wants to reduce her commuting costs (Solow, 1972; Wheaton, 1998).
When jobs relocate endogenously, land rents diminish near the CBD. However, marginal conges-
tion pricing for each commuter strengthens their willingness to pay the higher land rents associated
with a wage gap between the two business centers. Finally, the optimal size of the residential area
for individuals commuting to the CBD is never reached by these road pricing schemes. For 1
µ
= 2, a
Pigouvian tax leads to a CBD limit lower than the optimum, and vice versa for the cordon toll and
flat tax. Note that we consider each worker priced at her exact marginal cost under the Pigouvian
tax. The flat tax and the fixed fee to pass through the cordon are similar (τF = c = 0.148). This
amount of tax represents the marginal cost that pays a worker living at y
3
. The CBD limit under
Pigouvian taxation is always lower than the optimal location, as demonstrated analytically.
6.1 Efficiency of the three road pricing schemes in the polycentric city
This part examines the welfare and land use effects of second-best policies, comparing them to
the no-toll equilibrium within a polycentric city. First, the implementation of three different
instruments is investigated when there is a wage gap between the CBD and the SBDs. Table 2
illustrates relevant characteristics of the no-toll equilibrium, Pigouvian tax, flat tax and cordon
toll with equivalent tax rates, except for the location-constrained first-best policy. A welfare
Table 3: Simulated results of policy instruments within a polycentric city. (1/µ = 2).
No toll τP τF τCT
City limit, y 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Total travel time costs at ẑ 2.091 1.611 1.930 1.960
Total travel congestion costs at ẑ 0.00 0.567 0.148 0.148
Welfare, WP (ẑ) 5.267 5.38 5.33 5.32
Percentage change
against no-toll equilibrium
City limits (%) 0 0 0
Total travel time costs (%) −22.9 −7.70 −6.26
Welfare (%) 2.00 1.20 1.00
improvement at an aggregate level is significant under the second-best instruments mainly due to
the redistribution of both tax and land rent revenues. Under a Pigouvian tax, the welfare level
increases from 5.267 to 5.38, that is, 2% higher than the welfare of the no-toll equilibrium. Indeed,
the toll and the aggregate land rents are returned as lump sums to each worker who does not own
their housing. When the congestion externality is internalized at each given location, the total
travel costs (in terms of time and money) falls from 2.091 to 1.611 for a worker living in ẑ and
working in the CBD. Total welfare covers all inhabitants, landowners, agricultural landlords and
makes them better off with second-best instruments compared to the no-toll equilibrium. Indeed,
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regarding a flat tax and a cordon toll, welfare is higher by 1.20% and 1.00%, respectively, for a
worker. A Pigouvian tax and the optimum lead to an increase in the welfare level of 2%. The
CBD area where workers live is too small under the Pigouvian tax. That is why households living
in ẑ benefit from the shortest maximum traveled distance between the CBD and their residence.
Travel demand is unaffected, as each worker must commute every day. The rent bids capitalize
the tax effects, increasing strongly near each business center. For a given city limit, aggregate
welfare is maximized when the CBD limit ẑ = ẑO, and the numerical simulations demonstrate
that this size is not achieved with a location-constrained first-best policy where congestion is
priced and taxes and land rents are returned as lump sums to workers with a wage gap between
the business centers (2). When 1
µ
= 2, aggregate welfare is compared across road pricing schemes,
which yields:
∆WPτ =

WP (τP ) > WP (τF )
WP (τF ) > WP (τCT )
WP (τP ) > WP (τCT )
(40)
With these different instruments internalizing the congestion externality, welfare in the polycentric
city is always above that in the no-toll equilibrium. Workers are better off under each pricing
scheme when they live in a polycentric city until 1
µ
reaches 1
µ
according to the simulations. Hence,
an increasing pecuniary cost of transport through each road pricing scheme leads to a decrease
in the CBD size compared to the equilibrium location, which is in accordance with the results
of Zhang and Kockelman (2016b) for a given wage gap. The derived analytical solutions are
non-linear; hence, the numerical simulations help us to confirm that ẑ∗ is always superior to ẑtoll
when 1 < 1
µ
< 1
µ
29. Note that for two business centers offering the same wage rate, the CBD size
ẑ = y/3 is similar under the no-toll equilibrium, the optimum, Pigouvian taxation, and flat tax
schemes. These results are in accordance with the literature, as any taxation leads to an increase
in the city’s compactness (Zhang and Kockelman, 2016a). Road pricing schemes force workers
to relocate closer to the CBD in accordance with the findings of Anas (2013). A Pigouvian tax
decreases CBD size more than the other pricing schemes. The optimal location of ẑ is higher than
that of ẑP and lower than ẑF and Ĉ according to our simulations.
29The following values have been selected: L = 2, ωS = 2, ωC =
1
µωS ,m = 2, δ = 1, a = 0.5, τ0 =
1
5 , τ1 =
1
6 , h =
1, t0 = 0,.
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7 Discussion
This section addresses the implementation of a mass transit service close to the CBD and considers
the possible impacts on congestion and land rents. The two spatial configurations are compared
according to their welfare, congestion levels and wage rates over the long run. Finally, the imple-
mentation of a parking policy instead of a pricing congestion policy is discussed.
7.1 Incidence of modal choice on congestion and urban structure
Over 60 million passenger-kms were covered by mass transit in the Ile-de-France region of France
in 2014. This transit activity has grown by more than 30% since 2000 (CGDD, 2016). Therefore,
to remain realistic, assume that another mode of transit is introduced in the city, public transport
(bus). This mode uses a transportation infrastructure assumed to be provided by a public planner
(municipal government) at no cost. The market area of this mass transit mode is between the CBD
(x = 0) and xB. As there exists mixed land use for transport modes, workers prefer using mass
transit over their car when they live close to the CBD (Limtanakool et al., 2006). Furthermore, car
ownership levels increase with the distance from the city center (Dasgupta et al., 1985). Assume
that each worker in this area lives close to a bus stop, so they face no costs of access. Hence,
between the CBD and the outer border of the public transport area xB, the road’s capacity (1−a)
is equally divided between car and bus lanes on the single road. Beyond xB to y, each worker uses
exclusively her car. A mass transit user faces only a commuting time cost that is higher than the
free-flow travel time of car users. This cost depends on the waiting times at bus stops and the
travel time to the destination30. In other words, TB(x) > TA(x) without a congestion externality,
but passengers pay a fare tB, which is lower than average capital cost t0 of car ownership. To sum
up, transport pecuniary costs are given as follows:
tA(x) = t0x and tB(x) = tB (41)
A share of the population uses now public transport31, and each car user incurs congestion linked to
the number of commuter on the road between xB and ẑ, as well as reduced road capacity between
the CBD’s edge and xB. Each car user incurs a total commuting time expressed as follows:
TA(x) =

∫
x
0
[τ0 + 3τ1
∫ x
xB
∫ ẑ
x
l
(1−a)dz]dx, when 0 < xB < x < ẑ∫
x
zS
[τ0 + τ1
∫ y
x
l
(1−a)dz]dx, when zS < x < y
(42)
Note that the congestion parameter increases due to the decrease in road capacity near the business
center of each worker. The total congestion delay now depends on the size of the residential area
where car users live (i.e., ẑ − xB).
30Each user faces an exogenous commuting time cost. Waiting times at bus stops depend on the bus fleet size
and on the frequency at which the buses run (Small, 2004).
31Creutzig (2014) sets up a model including public transport close to the CBD and imposes this mode of travel on
the residents living in its market area. We simplify by abstracting from providing public transit and public transit
infrastructure at a cost.
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The polycentric city: In a polycentric city in equilibrium, the individual welfare of a worker
is similar at all locations. An individual living between 0 and xB has the following indirect utility:
V (x)B = ωC(1− TB(x))− R(x)h
a
− tB (43)
Between xB and ẑ:
V (x)A = ωC(1− TA(x))− RAh
a
− t0x (44)
The market size for mass transit is specified by the following indifference condition linked to the
time and pecuniary costs of each mode:
TB(xB) + tB = T (xB) + t0xB (45)
Initially, the residential area where workers live and from which they commute to the CBD is
larger than that of the SBD. The introduction of a bus lane on the existing road infrastructure
provides a disincentive for residents living close to the CBD to use their car. Workers living
near the border ẑ will see a rise in their transportation costs (both pecuniary and time costs).
Therefore, the equilibrium size of the CBD will decrease until the reduction in car users offsets the
higher congestion delay in the zone shared with the bus lane. The size of the SBD will increase;
hence, congestion near this business district will increase. From an economic point of view, the
introduction of two transport modes may reduce the size of the CBD to achieve the optimal size,
which has the same effect as a road pricing scheme32. In the case of a road pricing scheme targeting
drivers, (tA(x) = t0x + τk(x)), the effect would be similar to our results in section 6, namely, a
decrease in the equilibrium size of the CBD and an increase in the number of workers commuting to
the SBD. A second transport mode would reinforce the effects of the different taxes as second-best
policies. The intuition is as follows: when a second mode of transport is used without improving
the road infrastructure for motorists, they face (i) lower transport costs (user effect) and (ii) lower
road capacity (time cost effect). When the user effect is marginally predominant, the CBD grows,
attracting workers from the SBD until there is no incentive to relocate. When the time cost effect
dominates, CBD size decreases.
Parking policy Urban tolls are designed to restrain travel demand and alleviate congestion
within cities. While economists have largely studied the impact of congestion pricing schemes on
land use and traffic patterns, urban tolls have been scarcely implemented within cities around the
world (Brueckner, 2011). In the model, workers are assured that they can find a parking place
at their employment site. Therefore, there is no cruising and no additional congestion. Arnott
(2011) points out that parking policy in cities fails to take economic analysis into account. Indeed,
Shoup (2005) highlights the huge number of hours lost to cruising for parking in his empirical
study. Car parking is a serious issue, as a large urban space is used, each worker incurs extra
travel time, and fees do not differentiate between peak and off-peak hours (Albert and Mahalel,
2006). When a fixed cost to park is added to the budget constraint of a worker, her transport
costs increase. However, travel demand is inelastic at x and remains unaffected by parking fees in
the model. Therefore, implementing different road pricing schemes would not change the nature
of our previous results for a given city size and road’s capacity.
32However, from an environmental point of view, the size of the road network used by drivers does not necessarily
decrease. This is why CO2 emissions may remain equivalent for cities of a given size.
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8 Conclusion
This chapter develops and explores economic and land use tools in order to tackle the congestion
externality in monocentric and polycentric settings. For a given city size, the optimal response is
consistent with the development of SBDs, clustering firms that can offer the same wage rate as
in the CBD. With unpriced congestion, this urban structure minimizes the negative externality
incurred by each road user and maximizes welfare within the city. When the economy in the
polycentric city is consistent with empirical findings, the equilibrium size of the CBD is larger
than optimum one. The CBD is more attractive due to a higher wage rate and a higher wage net
of transport costs in comparison with the monocentric structure for a given city size. Three main
results are noteworthy.
First, the implementation of a Pigouvian tax on commuters is only a location-constrained first-
best policy because the optimal location of the SBDs is not achieved. This tax yields a residential
area that is too small and close to a CBD. Welfare is definitely greatest compared with the other
road pricing schemes regarding the revenue return schemes. However, at the aggregate level, this
tax does not internalize the decentralization of jobs in SBDs, preventing it from achieving the
optimum. This Pigouvian tax remind us to internalize the congestion externality that road users
impose to each other not only at their residential location but also during their daily commute to
their workplace. We need also to tax firms that do not internalize effects on congestion when jobs
are decentralized.
Second, a flat tax and a cordon toll are second-best policies that do not yield an optimal location
of the SBDs. On the one hand, a flat tax is homogeneous across road users; hence, they are not
distinguished according to the marginal damage they impose on other commuters. Indeed, workers
living near a business center (CBD or SBDs) are underpriced in relation to the congestion delay
they impose on other road users and the proportionality of the tax with respect to the traveled
distances. On the other hand, a cordon toll clearly differentiates among commuters, similar to the
Pigouvian tax, but the tax burden is asymmetric. The residential area where individuals live and
from which they commute to the CBD is larger than that near the SBDs; hence, the cordon toll
is settled in the former area. Only workers living between the cordon toll location and the CBD
limit pay a fixed fee to commute to the CBD. Simultaneously, individuals living in other residential
areas near the SBDs do not incur higher transport costs because the marginal congestion delays
they impose on other users are much lower than those imposed by individuals living close to the
CBD. To sum up, the efficiency of these road pricing schemes depends mainly on the wage gap
between business centers within the polycentric city before the implementation of this road pricing
scheme33. According to the initial location of the SBDs (too small or too large), a flat tax may be
less (resp., more) harmful than a cordon toll.
Finally, we demonstrate that a polycentric city in an unpriced congestion context yields a
suboptimal location of the CBD limit, which is too large compared to the optimal size. According
to the magnitude of the transport costs, the CBD may be too small or too large. The location is
suboptimal since the indifferent worker living at the CBD limit (the left endpoint of the SBD area)
decides to commute to the CBD without taking into account the marginal benefits obtained by
individuals living near a SBD. She does not take into account the marginal damage costs incurred
by road users commuting to the CBD as well. Conversely, this indifferent worker does not pay
33Accordingly, the travel time and pecuniary costs incurred by each worker depend on the wage gap, which
determines the size of the influence area of each business center.
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attention to the marginal damage costs incurred by workers living near a SBD when she decides
to drive towards it. In addition, marginal benefits obtained by individuals working in the CBD
are not taken into account as well. Her marginal move due to a change in the wage gap will not
induce large differences in her transport costs (time and money) compared to her previous location
under the suboptimal equilibrium.
Developing subcenters may alleviate the congestion cost for each road user provided that no
distortions exist for the labor or housing markets when congestion is unpriced. However, we
know that a transport improvement yields direct benefits and indirect costs, as noted by Arnott
(1979) in the same context. As long as growth of traffic flows and urban sprawl costs do not
substantially decrease the direct benefits from jobs relocations, urban planning remains a key
policy for addressing urban transport issues compared to pricing schemes. Indeed, road pricing
schemes benefit all landlords regardless of the closed-city structure. Hence, pricing congestion
implies political concerns regarding the redistribution of tax revenues when negative externality
is internalized. In addition, the desirability of multiple business centers may decrease due to
an increase in the average traveled distance; hence, the congestion externality may worsen when
housing size adjusts in the long run.
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Appendix
A. The equilibrium border with a monocentric city.
The population constraint is given by:
m
∫ y
0
a
h
dx = L
so that:
yM =
Lh
ma
B. The total commuting time of an individual living at distance x from the CBD
Assume that each worker uses a car for home-to-work commutes. The travel time per unit of
distance depends on the free-flow travel time and the congestion delay due to commuters living
beyond x along the road:
τ(x) = τ0 + τ1(
∫ y
x
a
h(1− a)dz)
β
We integrate this travel time over the interval [0,y] to determine the total commuting time of
the worker located at the city limits. Hence, we obtain:
TM(y) =
∫
y
0
[τ0 + τ1
∫ y
z
a
h(1− a)dz]dx
yielding:
TM(y) = yτ0 + τ1
a
h(1− a)(y
2/2).
C. The monocentric city: First- and second-best policies versus no-toll equilibrium
The aggregate welfare under a no-toll equilibrium is expressed as follows:
W ∗M =
ma
h
[∫ yM
0
ωC(1− T (x))dx−
∫ yM
0
t0xdx
]
−ALRM +
[
ALRM −m
∫ yM
0
RAdx
]
+m
∫ yM
0
RAdx
with:
ALRM = m
∫ yM
0
ΨM(x)dx.
When a road pricing scheme is implemented, the aggregate welfare becomes:
W ∗∗M =
ma
h
[∫ yM
0
ωC(1− TM(x))dx−
∫ yM
0
t0xdx−
∫ yM
0
τk(x)dx+Gk
]
− ALRM
+
[
ALRM −m
∫ yM
0
RAdx
]
+m
∫ yM
0
RAdx
with:
Gk =
∫ yM
0
τk(x)dx
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Pigouvian tax Each road user is charged a toll at the exact marginal social cost she imposes
on others for a given residential location and a given workplace:
τP (x) =
∫ x
0
ωCτ1a
h(1− a)(yM − x)dx
Then, the total revenue from the Pigouvian tax is written as follows:
GP =
∫ yM
0
τP (x)dx
=
mωCτ1a
2
h2(1− a)
∫ yM
0
[
yMx− x
2
2
]
dx
=
mωCτ1a
2y3M
3h2(1− a)
The indirect utility VM includes the Pigouvian tax as well as the lump-sum transfer (
Gk
L
) leading
to:
VP(yM) = ωC − yM
[
ωCτ0 + t0 − ωCτ1ayM
2h(1− a)
]
− RAh
a
− τk(yM) + GP
L
+
ALRP
L
Note that the Pigouvian tax is capitalized in bids rent yielding:
ΨP(x) =
a [h(ωCτ0 + t0)(1− a)(yM − x) + ωCτ1a(yM − x)2]
h2(1− a) +RA,
Flat kilometer tax The public authority decides to implement a flat tax per mile traveled
instead of a Pigouvian tax. The uniform tax is the following:
τF (x) = tFx
The benefits from this tax are returned as lump sums to the residents and given by:
GF =
ma
h
∫ yM
0
tFxdx
=
matFy
2
M
2h
Hence, inserting the flat tax, (GF
L
) and the aggregate land rent lump sum (ALRM
L
) yields:
VF(yM) = ωC − yM
[
ωCτ0 + t0 + tF +
ωCτ1ayM
2h(1− a)
]
− RAh
a
+
ALRM
L
+
GF
L
(46)
The flat tax is capitalized in the suboptimal bid rent yielding:
ΨF(x) =
a[2h(ωCτ0 + t0 + tF )(yM − x)(1− a) + ωCτ1a(yM − x)2]
2h2(1− a) +RA, (47)
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Cordon toll Instead of a Pigouvian tax or a flat tax, the public authority decides to set a cordon
toll at the location αyM (0 < α ≤ 1). Traffic flow is assumed to be uninterrupted when passing
the cordon. The commuters are charged according to the following toll scheme:
τCT =
{
c if x ≥ αy
0, otherwise
(48)
The revenue return scheme is now given by:
GCT =
mayM(1− α)2c
2h
(49)
Hence, the individual welfare near the CBD is given by:
VCT (x > αyM) = ωC
[
1− xτ0 − τ1a(2yMx− x
2)
2h(1− a)
]
− t0x− ΨCh
a
+
ALRM
L
+
Gk
L
(50)
and at the city limits by:
VCT (yM) = ωC − yM
[
ωCτ0 + t0 +
ωCτ1ayM
2h(1− a)
]
− c− RAh
a
+
ALRM
L
+
Gk
L
(51)
Near the CBD, the suboptimal bid rent is expressed as follows:
Ψ0(x < αyM) = a [ωC [TM(yM)− TM(x)] + t0(y − x)] +
[
RA +
ca
h
]
(52)
The product of the lump-sum tax (c) and the population density is now capitalized in the rent
between the cordon toll and the city limit. The rent between the location αyM and yM is given
by:
Ψ0(x > αyM) = a[ωC(TM(yM)− TM(x)) + t0(yM − αyM) +RA (53)
There is a rent discontinuity at the cordon toll location.
D. The polycentric city
D1. Equilibrium border
The population constraint is given by:∫ ẑ
0
a
h
dx+
∫ y
ẑ
a
h
dx =
L
m
so that: ∫ ẑ
0
a
h
dx+
∫ y
ẑ
a
h
dx =
L
m∫ ẑ
0
a
h
dx+ 2
∫ y
zp
a
h
dx =
L
m
a
h
ẑ + 2
a
h
y − ẑ
2
=
L
m
leading to:
y =
Lh
ma
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D2. CBD limit in equilibrium with a wage gap
A worker living at ẑ is indifferent between traveling to the CBD or the SBD. Therefore, we have:
ωC
[
1− ẑτ0 − τ1aẑ
2
2h(1− a)
]
− t0ẑ = ωS
[
1− τ0(y − ẑ
2
)− τ1a(y − ẑ)
2
8h(1− a)
]
− t0(y − ẑ
2
)
Inserting µωC = ωS due to the wage gap between the business districts yields:
ẑ∗(µ) =
−2h(1− a) [ωC(2 + µ)τ0 + 3t0]− µωCτ1ay + 2
√
µω2Cτ
2
1a
2y2 + ∆∗
ωC(4− µ)τ1a
with:
∆∗ = h2(−1+a)2 [ωC(2 + µ)τ0 + 3t0]2+2h(1−a)
[
(4 + µ2)ω2C − 5µω2C + ωC(2 + µ)τ0y + 3µω2Cτ0y
]
τ1a
leading to:
Γ = ωC
[
1− µ+ τ0
(
ẑ(−2− µ) + µy
2
)
+
τ1a [µ(y − ẑ)2 − 4ẑ2]
8h(1− a)
]
+ t0
(
y − 3ẑ
2
)
,
with Γ ≡ 0. According to the implicit function theorem, we have:
∂Γ
∂k
+
∂Γ
∂ẑ
∂ẑ
∂k
= 0
where k is an exogenous variable from the model. Equivalently, we have:
∂ẑ
∂k
= −∂Γ/∂k
∂Γ/∂ẑ
Trivial calculations yield:
sign
∂ẑ
∂τ0
= sign
∂ẑ
∂µ
< 0, sign
∂ẑ
∂y
> 0
sign
∂Γ
∂t0
= sign
[
y − 3ẑ
2
]
< 0
where the term in brackets is equal to y
2
when ẑ = 0 and decreases when ẑ increases. In addition
we have:
sign
∂Γ
∂τ1
= sign
∂Γ
∂h
= sign
∂Γ
∂a
= sign
[
µ(y − ẑ)2 − 4ẑ2] < 0 (0 < µ < 1)
where the term in brackets is equal to µy2 when ẑ = 0 and decreases when ẑ increases.
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D3. Welfare Welfare within the polycentric city is now defined as follows:
WS(ẑ
∗(µ)) =
ma
h
[∫ ẑ
0
ωC [1− T (x)]− t0xdx+ 2
∫ y
zp
ωS [1− T (x)]− t0(x− zS)dx
]
− ALRP
+
[
ALRP −m
∫ y
0
RAdx
]
+m
∫ y
0
RAdx
WS(ẑ
∗(µ)) =
ma
h
[
ωC ẑ
∗(1− µ) + µωCy −
(µωCτ0 + t0)
(
y2 − ẑ∗2)
2
− (ωCτ0 + t0)ẑ
∗2
2
− ωCτ1a
[
4ẑ∗3 + µ(y − ẑ)∗3]
12h(1− a)
]
D4. Proof of proposition 2
The aggregate welfare in the no-toll equilibrium can be defined as follows:
W ∗S =
ma
h
[∫ ẑ
0
ωC [1− T (x)]− t0xdx+ 2
∫ y
zp
ωC [1− T (x)]− t0(x− zS)dx
]
− ALRP
+
[
ALRP −m
∫ y
0
RAdx
]
+m
∫ y
0
RAdx
Free-market and optimal sizes of the CBD limit when µ = 1
The indifference function of ẑ is expressed as follows:
ωC
[
1− ẑτ0 − τ1aẑ
2
2h(1− a)
]
− t0ẑ = ωC
[
1− (y − zS)τ0 − τ1a(y − zS)
2
2h(1− a)
]
− t0(y − zS)
yielding:
ẑ2
[
3ωCτ1a
8h(1− a)
]
+ ẑ
[
3ωCτ0
2
+
3t0
2
+
ωCτ1a
4h(1− a)
]
−
[
ωCτ0y
2
+
t0y
2
+
ωCτ1ay
2
8h(1− a)
]
= 0
leading to:
ẑ∗ =
y
3
Then, the size of the CBD in which workers live is determined by a benevolent planner in order
to maximize welfare WP (ẑ) subject to:{
VC(ẑ) = ωC(1− xτ0 − τ1ah(1−a) [ẑx− x2/2])− ΨP (x)ha − t0x > 0
VS(ẑ) = ωC(1− (x− zS)τ0 − τ1ah(1−a) [y(x− zS) +
z2S−x2
2
])− ΨP (x)h
a
− t0(x− zS) > 0
We have:
∂WS(ẑ)
∂ẑ
= 0
Hence:
mωCτ
2
1a
2(y + ẑ)(y − 3ẑ)
4h2(1− a) = 0
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leading to:
ẑO =
y
3
Hence, ẑ∗ = ẑO and their expression has been inserted in the aggregate welfare function (??)
yielding:
WS(ẑ
O) = L
[
ωC − (ωCτ0 + t0)y
2
− ωCτ1ay
2
27h(1− a)
]
As a result, we have:
WS(ẑ
O)−W ∗M =
mωCτ1a
2(y − ẑ)(y + ẑ)2
4h2(1− a) > 0 (54)
D5. Proof of proposition 3
Aggregate welfare, including a wage gap within the city, can be defined as follows:
WS =
ma
h
[∫ ẑ
0
[1− T (x)]− t0xdx+ 2
∫ y
ẑS
ωS [1− T (x)]− t0(x− zS)dx
]
− ALRP
+ [ALRP −m
∫ y
0
RAdx] +m
∫ y
0
RAdx
with:
ALRP = m
∫ ẑ
0
Ψ0(x)dx+ 2m
∫ y
zS
ΨP (x)dx
yielding:
WP = ωC ẑ + ωS(y − ẑ)− ωCτ0ẑ − ωSτ0(y − ẑ)− ωCτ1aẑ
3
3h(1− a) −
2ωSτ1a(
y−ẑ
2
)3
3h(1− a) − t0
y2
2
Then, the left endpoint of the SBD ẑO is determined when there exists a wage gap between the
business centers. The maximization of aggregate welfare WP (ẑ) is subject to:
VS(ẑ)

ωC(1− xτ0 − τ1ah(1−a) [ẑx− x2/2])− Ψ0(x)ha − t0x > 0
ωP (1− (x− zS)τ0 − τ1ah(1−a) [y(x− zS) +
z2S−x2
2
])− ΨP (x)h
a
− (x− zS)t0 > 0
ẑ < y
Then, we obtain:
∂WS(ẑ)
∂ẑ
= ωC − ωS + ωSτ0 − ωCτ0 − ωCτ1aẑ
2
h(1− a) +
ωSτ1a(y − ẑ)2
4h(1− a)
Thus, ∂WS(ẑ)
∂ẑ
= 0 leads to a single maximum for WS(ẑ) when ẑ ∈ [0, y], which reaches:
ẑO(µ) =
−2h(1− a)ωC(1− µ)τ0 − µωCτ1ay + 2
√
µω2Cτ
2
1a
2y2 + ∆O
ωC(4− µ)τ1a
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with:
∆O = h2(−1 + a)2 [ωC(1− µ)]2 τ 20 + h(1− a)
[
(4 + µ2)ω2C + µω
2
Cτ0y − µ2ω2Cτ0y
]
τ1a
Furthermore, WS(ẑ) is a concave curve since
∂2WS
∂2ẑ
yields the following result:
∂2WS
∂2ẑ
=
ma
h
[
(ωS − ωC)τ0 − [24ωC ẑ + 6ωS(y − ẑ)] τ1a
12h(1− a)
]
< 0 (55)
This optimal CBD size varies positively with the wage rate discrepancy between the business
centers within the polycentric setting:
∂WS
∂ẑO
> 0, when 1 <
1
µ
<
1
µ
E. Monocentric city versus Polycentric city
Congestion level
Note that the differential in the total commuting time cost between the two cities is given by
∆T (y), with:
∆T (y) = TM(yM)− T (y)
= τ0zS +
τ1a[y
2 − (y−ẑ
2
)2]
2h(1− a)
In addition, we have ∆T (ẑ), with:
∆T (ẑ) = TM(yM)− T (ẑP )
= τ0(y − ẑ) + τ1a(y
2 − ẑ2)
2h(1− a)
Thus, ∆T (y) > 0 and ∆T (ẑ) > 0, with an average congestion delay that is higher in the mono-
centric setting.
Welfare comparison. When we assume there is no wage gap within the polycentric city, the
welfare is given by:
WS(ẑ
∗) =
ma
h
[
ωCy − (ωCτ0 + t0)y
2
2
− ωCτ1a(4ẑ
3∗ + (y − ẑ∗)3)
12h(1− a)
]
and in the monocentric city:
WM = L
[
ωC − yM(ωCτ0 + t0)
2
− ωCτ1ay
2
3h(1− a)
]
Therefore, the comparison with the monocentric city yields ∆V = WM −WS, with:
∆V = ωC(1− µ)(y − ẑtoll) + ωCτ0(1− µ)(ẑtoll − y)
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+
ωCτ1a(ẑtoll
3 − y3)
3h(1− a) +
ωSτ1a(
y−ẑtoll
2
)3
3h(1− a)
Regarding the evolution of the welfare between the monocentric and the polycentric city, we obtain
the following expression:
∆W (µ) =
ma(y − ẑ) [h(1− a) (12(ωS − ωC) + 6ωCτ0(y + ẑ)− 3ωSτ0(y − ẑ) + 3t0(y + 3ẑ)) + 4ωCτ1a(y2 + yẑ + ẑ2)]
12h2(1− a)
(56)
It is straightforward to check that the aggregate welfare levels are equal when ẑ(µ) = y. In other
words, when µ = 1− (τ0 + t0ωC )y −
τ1ay2
2h(1−a) . Here, the difference in welfare depends heavily on the
magnitude of the wage gap between the business centers within the polycentric city.
F. Road pricing schemes in the polycentric city:
F1. Quasi-first-best vs. equilibrium
The city limits remain identical to the benchmark equilibrium, as housing size is exogenous. Thus,
we obtain the bid rent in a suboptimal equilibrium:
Ψ0(x) =
a [h(1− a)(ωCτ0 + t0)(ẑS − x) + ωCτ1a(ẑS − x)2]
h2(1− a) +RA
and when zS < x < y:
ΨP (x) =
a [h(1− a)(ωSτ0 + t0)(y − x) + ωSτ1a(y − x)2]
h2(1− a) +RA
The ”Pigouvian” tax is determined as follows:
τP (x) =
∫
x
0
[
τ1a
h(1− a)
∫ ẑ
x
ωC dz]dx and τPT (x) =
∫
x
ẑ
[
τ1a
h(1− a)
∫ y
x
ωS dz]dx,
with:
τP (x) =
∫
x
0
[
τ1a
h(1− a)
∫ ẑ
x
ωC dz]dx
=
τ1a
h(1− a)
∫ x
0
ωC(ẑ − x) dx
=
ωCτ1a(ẑx− x2/2)
h(1− a)
when 0 < x < ẑ. Because of symmetry around the SBD, we have:∫
x
ẑ
[
τ1a
h(1− a)
∫ y
x
ωSdz
]
dx =
∫
x
zS
[
τ1a
h(1− a)
∫ y
x
ωSdz
]
dx
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=
τ1a
h(1− a)
∫ x
zS
ωS(y − x)dx
=
ωSτ1a
[
y(x− zS)− x
2−z2S
2
]
h(1− a)
when ẑ < x < y. Using the Pigouvian tax and the indifference condition of a worker living in ẑ
yields:
ωC
[
1− ẑτ0 − τ1aẑ
2
h(1− a)
]
− t0ẑ = ωS
[
1− (y − ẑ
2
)τ0 −
τ1a(
y−ẑ
2
)2
h(1− a)
]
− t0(y − ẑ
2
)
in which ωS = µωC and (21) have been inserted, leading to:
ẑP (µ) =
h(−1 + a) [ωC(2 + µ)τ0 + 3t0]− ωSτ1ay +
√
4µω2Cτ
2
1a
2y2 + ∆P
ωC(4− µ)τ1a
with:
∆P = h
2(−1 + a)2 [ωC(2 + µ)τ0 + 3t0]2
+ 4h(1− a) [(4 + µ2)ω2C − 5µω2C + ωC(2 + µ)τ0y + 3µω2Cτ0y] τ1a
Welfare is now given by:
WP =
ma
h
[∫ ẑ
0
V0dx+ 2
∫ y
zS
VP
]
+GP
+
[
ALRP −
∫ y
0
RAdx
]
+
∫ y
0
RAdx
where aggregate land rents and toll revenues returned as lump sums:
ALRP =
ma
h
[∫ ẑ
0
Ψ0h
a
dx+ 2
∫ y
zS
ΨPh
a
dx
]
and GP =
ma
h
∫ y
0
τk(x)dx
Thus, we find the following welfare:
WP =
ma
h
[
ωC ẑ − (ωCτ0 + t0)ẑ
2
2
− ωCτ1aẑ
3
3h(1− a) + ωS(y − ẑ)−
(ωSτ0 + t0)(y − ẑ)2
4
− (ωSτ1a(y − ẑ)
3
12h(1− a)
]
+
ma
h
[
(ωCτ0 + t0)ẑ
2
2
+
ωCτ1aẑ
3
3h(1− a) +
(ωSτ0 + t0)(y − ẑ)2
4
+
(ωSτ1a(y − ẑ)3
12h(1− a)
]
+mRAy
Then, we derive WP with respect to ẑ leading to:
∂WS
∂ẑ
=
ma
h
[
ωC − (ωCτ0 + t0)ẑ − ωCτ1aẑ
2
h(1− a) − ωS +
(ωSτ0 + t0)(y − ẑ)
2
+
(ωSτ1a(y − ẑ)2
4h(1− a)
]
+
ma
h
[
(ωCτ0 + t0)ẑ +
ωCτ1aẑ
2
h(1− a) −
(ωSτ0 + t0)(y − ẑ)
2
− (ωSτ1a(y − ẑ)
2
4h(1− a)
]
When ẑ = ẑP :
∂WP
∂ẑ
∣∣∣∣
ẑ=ẑP
=
ma
h
[ωC − ωS] > 0
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F2. The polycentric city: Second-best vs. equilibrium
The flat tax The bids rent including the flat tax are given by:
Ψ0(x) =
a [2h(1− a)(ωCτ0 + t0 + τk)(ẑF − x) + ωCτ1a(ẑF − x)2]
2h2(1− a) +RA
and:
ΨP (x) =
a [2h(1− a)(ωSτ0 + t0 + tF )(y − x) + ωSτ1a(y − x)2]
2h2(1− a) +RA
when zS < x < y. Using the indirect utility formula with the flat tax and (37) yields the indirect
utility given by:
VS = ωS
[
1− (y − ẑ
2
)τ0 −
aτ1(
y−ẑ
2
)2
2h(1− a)
]
+ G¯T +
ALR
L
− (t0 + tF )(y − ẑ
2
)− RAh
a
The indifference condition of a worker living in ẑ yields:
ωC
[
1− ẑτ0 − τ1aẑ
2
2h(1− a)
]
− (t0 + tF )ẑ = ωS
[
1− (y − ẑ
2
)τ0 −
τ1a(
y−ẑ
2
)2
2h(1− a)
]
− (t0 + tF )(y − ẑ
2
)
yielding:
zF =
−2h(1− a) [τ0(2ωC + ωS) + 3(t0 + tF )]− ωSτ1ay + 2
√
∆F
(4ωC − ωS)τ1a
with:
∆F = h
2(−1 + a)2 [τ0(2ωC + ωS) + 3(t0 + tF )]2
+ 2h(1− a)τ1a
[
4ω2C + ω
2
S + 3ωCωSτ0y − 5ωCωS + (2ωC + ωS)(t0 + tF )y
]
+ ωCωSτ
2
1a
2
Welfare is given by:
WF (tF ) =
ma
h
[∫ ẑ
0
ωC [1− T (x)]− t0(x)dx+ 2
∫ y
zS
ωS [1− T (x)]− t0(x− zS)dx
]
with:
ALRF =
ma
h
[∫ ẑ
0
Ψ0h
a
dx+ 2
∫ y
zS
ΨPh
a
dx
]
Hence, the following welfare is:
WF (tF ) =
ma
h
[
ωC ẑ − (ωCτ0 + t0)ẑ
2
2
− ωCτ1aẑ
3
3h(1− a) + ωS(y − ẑ)− (ωSτ0 + t0)
(
y − ẑ
2
)2
− ωSτ1a(y − ẑ)
3
12h(1− a)
]
Then, we derive WS with respect to ẑ yielding:
∂WS
∂ẑ
=
ma
h
[
ωC − (ωCτ0 + t0)ẑ − ωCτ1aẑ
2
h(1− a) − ωS + (ωSτ0 + t0)
(
y − ẑ
2
)
− ωSτ1a(y − ẑ)
2
4h(1− a)
]
When ẑ = ẑF :
∂WS
∂ẑ
∣∣∣∣
ẑ=ẑF
=
ma
h
[
ωC − ωS − ωCτ1aẑ
2
2h(1− a) +
ωSτ1a(y − ẑ)2
8h(1− a) − tF (
y − 3ẑ
2
)
]
≶ 0
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F3. The polycentric city: Second-best vs. equilibrium
Cordon toll The amount of collected tax is redistributed to each household and expressed
as follows:
GCT =
∫ ẑC
βẑC
τk(x)dx
leading to:
G¯CT =
ma(ẑC − βẑC)2c
2hL
The bid rent including the cordon toll is given by:
Ψ0(x) =
a [2h(1− a)(ωCτ0 + t0)(ẑC − x) + ωCτ1a(ẑC − x)2]
2h2(1− a) +RA +
ca
h
When αẑC < x < ẑC :
Ψ0(x) =
a [2h(1− a)(ωCτ0 + t0)(ẑC − x) + aωCτ1(ẑC − x)2]
2h2(1− a) +RA
The indirect utility of the inhabitant who lives at ẑC and works in the CBD is now given by:
VCT (ẑC) = ωC
[
1− ẑCτ0 − aτ1ẑC
2
2h(1− a)
]
+ G¯CT +
ALRCT
L
− t0ẑC − c− RAh
a
When zS < x < y:
VCT (y) = ωS
[
1− (y − ẑC
2
)τ0 −
aωSτ1(
y−ẑC
2
)2
2h(1− a) )
]
+ G¯CT +
ALRCT
L
− t0(y − ẑC
2
)− RAh
a
The limit of the CBD ẑ is implicitly defined by:
ωC
[
1− ẑτ0 − τ1aẑ
2
2h(1− a)
]
− t0ẑ − c = ωS
[
1− (y − ẑ
2
)τ0 −
τ1a(
y−ẑ
2
)2
2h(1− a)
]
− t0(y − ẑ
2
)
yielding:
zC =
−2h(1− a) [τ0(2ωC + ωS) + 3t0]− ωSτ1ay + 2
√
∆C
(4ωC − ωS)τ1a
with:
∆C = h
2(−1 + a)2 [τ0(2ωC + ωS) + 3t0]2
+ 2h(1− a)τ1a
[
4ω2C + ω
2
S + 3ωCωSτ0y − 5ωCωS + (2ωC + ωS)t0y − (4ωC − ωS)c
]
+ ωCωSτ
2
1a
2y2
Welfare is given by:
WCT =
ma
h
[∫ αẑ
0
ωC [1− T (x)]− t0(x)dx+
∫ ẑ
αẑ
ωC [1− T (x)]− t0(x)dx+ 2
∫ y
zS
ωS [1− T (x)]− t0(x− zS)dx
]
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with:
ALRCT =
ma
h
[∫ ẑ
0
Ψ0h
a
dx+ 2
∫ y
zS
ΨPh
a
dx
]
Hence, the following welfare is:
WCT =
ma
h
[
ωC ẑ − (ωCτ0 + t0)ẑ
2
2
− ωCτ1aẑ
3
3h(1− a) + ωS(y − ẑ)− (ωSτ0 + t0)
(
y − ẑ
2
)2
− ωSτ1a(y − ẑ)
3
12h(1− a)
]
Then, we derive WCT with respect to ẑ yielding:
∂WCT
∂ẑ
=
ma
h
[
ωC − (ωCτ0 + t0)ẑ − ωCτ1aẑ
2
h(1− a) − ωS + (ωSτ0 + t0)
(
y − ẑ
2
)
+
ωSτ1a(y − ẑ)2
4h(1− a)
]
When we derive WS with respect to ẑ conditional on ẑ = ẑC , it yields:
∂WS
∂ẑ
∣∣∣∣
ẑ=ẑC
=
ma
h
[
c+
ωSτ1a(y − ẑ)2
8h(1− a) +
(ωSτ0 + t0)(3ẑ − y)
2
]
≶ 0
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